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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN M. FRY and 
JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants/Third-party 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, 
Third-party Defendant. 
Case No. 900478 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are there any special or important reasons for this Court 
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, 
without opinion, the judgment of the trial court, where there is 
no apparent conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals 
or this Court, nor any other reason justifying review by cer-
tiorari? 
2. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict for the 
plaintiff passenger, where the defendant had stipulated that the 
plaintiff was not negligent, the trial court had previously 
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff's driver based on the 
uncontroverted evidence, the accident was not one which would 
happen in the absence of negligence, and the evidence established 
that defendant was negligent? 
3. If this Court determines that the trial court did err, 
should this case be remanded for a new trial on negligence only, 
because defendant has not claimed any error in the juries 
assessment damages? 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
There was no written opinion entered by the Court of Appeals. 
The case was decided on an expedited basis under Rule 31 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
JURISDICTION 
The Order of Affirmance of the Court of Appeals was filed 
September 18, 1990. Defendants' petition for Writ of Certiorari 
was filed October 13, 1990. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The provisions of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure are set forth below. Plaintiff-Appellee Rhodes is not 
aware of any other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or regulations which are controlling in this case. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in con-
flict with a decision of another panel of 
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the Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way that is in con-
flict with a decision of the Supreme 
Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of super-
vision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of munici-
pal, state, or federal law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover 
for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The criti-
cal parties in this action are appellee Hal Rhodes ("Rhodes") who 
is a passenger in an automobile driven by third-party defendant 
William C. Petersen ("Petersen"). The Peterson vehicle collided 
with a vehicle driven by defendant-appellant John M. Fry ("Fry"). 
Fry's mother, Judith L. Fry was also named as a defendant based on 
her signing of Fry's driver's license application. The pleadings 
Citations to those portions of the record which were 
paginated by the trial court clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure will be to "R. [page 
number]." Only one portion of the transcript was so paginated, 
that of the testimony of Dr. Rudolph Limpert on the second day of 
trial, November 29, 1988. The balance of transcript will be cited 
by date and page number, e.g. "Tr. 11-29-88 p. ". 
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at the time of trial included an amended complaint by plaintiff 
which stated claims for negligence against Fry and against 
Petersen. (R. 142-45.) Fry had filed a third-party complaint 
against Petersen. (R. 90-95.) 
The case was tried before a jury commencing November 28, 1988. 
(R. 374-86.) Petersen made a timely motion for directed verdict 
as against both plaintiff and Fry. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 102, 109; R. 
500.) The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Petersen. 
(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 197.) 
Rhodes made a timely motion for directed verdict that he was 
not negligent. All parties stipulated to the motion, and it was 
granted. (Id.) 
Rhodes also made a timely motion for a directed verdict that 
Fry was negligent. (Id.) The court took the motion under advise-
ment (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 9), and submitted the case to the jury. 
Fry requested, and the court rejected, a jury instruction on 
"unavoidable accident.11 (R. 324; Tr. 11-30-88 p. 46.) The case 
was submitted to the jury on a special verdict, but the jury was 
instructed to answer questions relating to the amount of 
plaintiff's damages regardless of its verdict on negligence. (Tr. 
11-30-88 p. 49.) 
The jury found that Fry was not negligent. (R. 303-04.) The 
trial court thereafter granted plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict, which had been taken under advisement during the trial. 
(R. 424-30.) The trial court subsequently entered formal Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 448-54) , and a Judgment (R. 455-
56). Fry filed his appeal on May 15, 1989. (R. 457-58.) Follow-
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ing the submission of the briefs, the Court of Appeals designated 
this case for expedited decision under Rule 31 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Oral arguments were held and the Court of 
Appeals thereafter entered its order affirming without opinion the 
judgment of the trial court. 
C. Statement of Facts. The accident giving rise to this 
action occurred shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 11, 1982, at 
the intersection of 1300 South and Main Street in Orem, Utah. (Tr. 
11-28-88 p. 47; Tr. 11-29-88 p. 8.) The road on which both 
vehicles were traveling, 1300 South, is the main arterial road 
leading from the 1-15 freeway to the University Mall in Orem, Utah. 
(A diagram of the intersection appears in the Appendix.) Plaintiff 
was a passenger in a Volkswagen "bug11 driven by William Petersen. 
Petersen and plaintiff were on a double date; plaintiff and his 
date were seated in the back seat, and Petersen and his date in the 
front seat. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 6.) The Volkswagen was proceeding 
east along 1300 South at a speed less than the speed limit.2 There 
was no evidence of any lane changes by the Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-
29-88 pp. 125, 133. See also Tr. 11-28-88 p. 64, Tr. 11-29-88 p. 
29.) The Volkswagen was travelling in the right-hand (South) lane 
of the road. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 58; tr. 11-29-88 p. 122.) The road 
at that point had two east-bound lanes plus a left-turn lane. 
2Rudolph Limpert, who testified for Fry, estimated the speed 
of the Volkswagen at 44 to 48 miles per hour prior to application 
of the brakes, and 30 to 35 miles per hour at the point of impact. 
(R. 487-88, 493.) Greg DuVal, who testified for plaintiff, 
estimated the speed of the Volkswagen at 38 miles per hour prior 
to braking, and 25 miles per hour on impact. (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26.) 
Petersen did not recall what speed he was going. (Id. p. 36.) The 
speed limit was 55 mph. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55.) 
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(Exs. 1 & 10, diagrams of accident scene, copies in appendix; Tr. 
11-30-88 pp. 16-17.) The roads were clear and dry, and although 
it was dark, the street lights were on and visibility was clear. 
(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 7, 32-33; Tr. 11-28-88 pp. 48-49.) The head-
lights on the Volkswagen were on. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 24, 132, 140.) 
John M. Fry, 16 years old at the time of the accident, was 
also on a date. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 31-32.) His vehicle was pro-
ceeding west on 1300 South. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.) He thought he 
was on the road to the Orem Recreation Center, but was confused and 
traveling 17 blocks off course in the wrong direction. (Tr. 11-
28-88 p. 56.) He turned his vehicle left through the intersection 
and into the path of the Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.) The 
Volkswagen left 35' 11" of skid marks in the right-hand travel lane 
(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55; Ex. 2), but still collided with sufficient 
force to cause the Volkswagen to spin around and to knock all four 
occupants of the Volkswagen unconscious. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 9, 56, 
132.) The four occupants in the Volkswagen therefore had little 
memory of the accident itself; however, Becky Jones, Petersen's 
date, recalled that she was turned around talking to plaintiff and 
his date when she felt Petersen slam on his brakes. She turned 
forward and saw the pick-up in front of the Volkswagen just as the 
collision occurred. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 131-32.) 
Fry and his date similarly had little memory of the accident. 
Fry testified (plaintiff disputed this testimony) that he had been 
stopped at a red light prior to entering the intersection, and when 
the light turned green, he looked for on-coming traffic, saw none, 
and proceeded to make his turn. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 105.) He further 
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testified that his vision was obstructed by a brown station wagon 
which was in the eastbound left turn lane and proceeding to turn 
left. (Id.) He also testified, however, that after making his 
initial visual check for on-coming vehicles and starting to make 
his turn, he did not again look for traffic in the eastbound lanes. 
Fry further acknowledged that his pickup sat "considerably higher 
off the road" than the station wagon. (Tr. 11-29-88 P. 44.) 
The impact occurred in the southern most lane when Fry was 
nearly through the intersection (Tr. 11-29-88 p. Ill), a distance 
of over 50 feet from where he began his turn (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26. )3 
It would have taken Fry at least six seconds to travel through the 
intersection. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 169.) Fry nonetheless unequivocal-
ly testified that he only looked for on-coming traffic prior to 
starting his turn and did not look again at any point during the 
turn. (Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 41, 46, 105.) 
Plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries in the 
accident, and has a 15% permanent partial disability as a result 
of the injuries. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 161.) He has suffered and 
continues to experience considerable low back pain, with the result 
that he cannot participate in sporting and other activities as he 
used to, and is limited in his abilities to work and lift objects. 
3This is not different from the testimony of Rudolph Limpert. 
Dr. Limpert testified that the pick-up traveled approximately 28.5 
feet from the moment that Petersen would have perceived the pick-
up. (R. 495.) Limpert gave no testimony concerning the total 
distance that Fry traveled across the intersection. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Review by a writ of certiorari is appropriate only when there 
is some special or important reason for such review. Fry asserts 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with other 
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, and that it 
constitutes a vast departure from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings. Neither assertion, however, is supported by 
the arguments in Fry's brief. 
The Court of Appeals did not issue an opinion setting forth 
any legal holdings; it is therefore impossible for the decision to 
conflict with other decisions of the Court of Appeals or this 
Court. A review of Fry's arguments reveals that the "conflict" is 
really a claim that the Court of Appeals failed to correctly apply 
existing judicial precedent. 
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court departed from 
established judicial precedent. The trial court did not, contrary 
to Fry's argument, rely on any "negligence per se" concept. The 
trial court determined, in accordance with prior decisions of this 
Court, that the accident was caused by the negligence by some 
person, and was not unavoidable. The trial court further 
determined, based on all of the evidence, that reasonable minds 
could reach no conclusion other than that Fry was negligent. 
Further, even if the decision of the Court of Appeals was a depar-
ture from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, 
it was not so great a departure as to warrant intervention by this 
Court. 
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In addition, Fry's assertion that the trial court held that 
a statutory violation is negligence per se was not raised before 
the trial court or the Court of Appeals. The argument should not 
be considered for the first time on a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON EXISTS 
FOR REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
Review by writ of certiorari is to be granted "only for 
special and important reasons." Utah R. App. P. 46. The types of 
cases appropriate for review by certiorari are those where the 
Court of Appeals has made a ruling on an issue of law which con-
flicts with another decision of the Court of Appeals, Utah R. App. 
P. 46(a), or of this Court, Utah R. App. P. 46(b), or where the 
decision is "so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 
46(c). This case does not meet any of these criteria. 
One of the obvious purposes of allowing review where a Court 
of Appeals' decision conflicts with other decisions is to prevent 
conflicting precedents. No such risk exists in this case, because 
the Court of Appeals did not issue an opinion. There is no opinion 
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which can conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals 
or of this Court.4 
The holding of the Court of Appeals likewise does not conflict 
with other decisions of this Court or of the Court of Appeals. 
Fry's claim is really a claim that the Court of Appeals misapplied 
the law to the facts, not that the trial court or the Court of 
Appeals had decided a question of law in a manner which conflicts 
with other decisions. This point is demonstrated more fully below 
in Point II of this brief. 
The discussion below also reveals that if any error was made, 
it did not lead to an unjust result nor constitute so far a depar-
ture from the usual course as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision. The trial court determined, and Fry 
did not appeal the determination, that the accident was not one 
which would happen in the absence of negligent, and that the other 
persons who were in a position to have caused the accident were not 
negligent as a matter of law. The overwhelming weight of the 
evidence confirmed the trial court's legal conclusion, and es-
4Rhodes does not assert that review by writ of certiorari is 
never appropriate from a Rule 31 decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Such review was granted, for example, in Yearslev v. Jensen, 144 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Oct. 3, 1990). Rhodes only suggests that the 
lack of a published opinion is a factor which this Court should 
consider in deciding whether review by certiorari is warranted. 
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, scheduled this case 
for disposition under Rule 31. The apparent reason for proceeding 
under Rule 31 is that the case involves a narrow issue, the 
evidence of Fry's negligence was overwhelming, the supposed "expert 
testimony" of Rudolph Limpert did not really address the critical 
issue, and justice clearly demanded a speedily resolution to avoid 
further delay in giving the awarded damages to Rhodes. These same 
factors should persuade this Court to deny the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
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tablished that Fry was negligent; indeed, there was no substantial 
evidence which would support a finding that Fry was not negligent. 
The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals was 
correct. Even if there were some technical error in the manner in 
which the decision was reached, however, no injustice was done. 
This is not a case which calls for an exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision by writ of certiorari. The petition should 
be denied. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT FRY WAS NOT 
NEGLIGENT. 
Point I of Fry's Petition asserts that there was competent 
evidence to support the jury finding that Fry was not negligent, 
relying mainly on testimony that Fry's view of oncoming traffic was 
obscured, and that his actions were not unreasonable. A closer 
look at all the evidence refutes the assertion. 
The standard to be applied by this court in reviewing the 
trial court's directed verdict is whether there was "substantial 
competent evidence" which would have supported a jury verdict that 
Fry was not negligent. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 418 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate of Kesler, 701 P.2d 86, 
95 (Utah 1985)). See also First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Utah 1989). "Substantial 
evidence" has been defined as follows: 
Substantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. Substantial 
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reason-
11 
able mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
No "substantial competent evidence" was presented in the 
instant case which would support a jury finding that Fry was not 
negligent. Although the evidence was conflicting in many par-
ticulars, certain facts were not disputed. The night was clear, 
the roads were dry, and, although it was night, the street lights 
were on and visibility was clear. The Volkswagen in which plain-
tiff was a passenger was in good operating condition, and its 
headlights were on. The Volkswagen had the right of way and was 
traveling at a speed well below the posted speed limit. The 
Volkswagen was traveling in the center lane of the three eastbound 
lanes and did not make any sudden lane changes immediately prior 
to the collision. In summary, there was absolutely no evidence, 
and the trial court properly so held, of any negligence or improper 
driving by Petersen, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was 
a passenger. Petersen had a right to be where he was and driving 
in the manner he was at the time of the accident. 
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Fry 
did not have the right of way. Fry intended to turn left across 
three lanes of traffic in an area where the posted speed limit was 
55 miles per hour. According to Fry's testimony, he looked for on-
coming traffic while his own pickup was stopped for a red light, 
but his view of on-coming traffic was at least partially obstructed 
by a station wagon in the eastbound left-turn lane. When the light 
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turned green, Fry looked once, did not see any on-coming traffic, 
and proceeded to turn. He traveled approximately 56 feet, taking 
approximately six seconds, before reaching the point of impact. 
After his initial visual check prior to starting his turn, he did 
not again even glance to see if there was any oncoming traffic from 
the eastbound lanes. In contrast, Petersen saw Fry and slammed on 
his brakes to avoid the accident. Petersen's vehicle left nearly 
36 feet of skid marks in a straight line in the right-hand lane of 
travel on Petersen's side of the road. 
If Petersen could see Fry, Fry obviously could have seen 
Petersen had he been looking. Fry had a duty to look and see what 
there was to see. The accident was totally avoidable had Fry done 
so and yielded to Petersen as required. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended bv Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided 
as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to 
the left within an intersection or into an 
alley, private road, or driveway shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is within the 
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
Fry violated this section, and his violation was a factor that 
the jury could consider in determining whether he was negligent.5 
5Fry asserts that the trial court improperly held that the 
violation of the statute constituted negligence per se. As an 
initial matter, this argument is raised for the first time in the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and should not be considered. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 
651, 657 (Utah 1988). The trial court did not, however, make an 
implicit holding of negligence per se. A review of the trial 
court's rulings shows that statute was cited only to show the 
(continued...) 
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Rhodes acknowledges that there are prior Utah decisions where a 
plaintiff has lost at trial against a left-turning driver, and has 
attempted on appeal to establish that the left-turning driver was 
negligent as a matter of law, and that the jury decisions have been 
affirmed. In each of these cases, however, there was €*vidence that 
the plaintiff was also negligent. For example, in Smith v. 
Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965), Smith was a pas-
senger in a vehicle driven by Jones which turned left at an 
intersection into the path of Gallegos, who was traveling straight 
through the intersection. Smith prevailed at trial, and Gallegos 
appealed, claiming that Jones was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law because he had failed to yield the right of way. 
This Court affirmed, holding that Jones was entitled to assume, in 
determining whether an on-coming vehicle constituted an immediate 
hazard, that other drivers were not negligent. The evidence showed 
that Gallegos was exceeding the speed limit, had accelerated just 
before or while going through the intersection, and may have 
suddenly switched lanes just before the intersection. This Court 
held that there was some evidence to support the jury's verdict 
that Jones was not negligent in failing to yield to Gallegos. 
Of similar effect is Gibbons v. Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 
184, 493 P.2d 1280 (1972), which also involved the question of 
whether a left-turning plaintiff was contributorily negligence as 
a matter of law. The defendant in Gibbons was exceeding the speed 
5(...continued) 
existence of a duty on the part of Fry, and was considered only as 
evidence of negligence in accordance with Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Utah 1978). 
14 
limit, and this Court accordingly affirmed the jury verdict of no 
contributory negligence. 
Another example is McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
The plaintiff was traveling straight through the intersection and 
was struck by a car turning left. The jury found the plaintiff 
100% at fault. The evidence showed, however, that the plaintiff 
was exceeding the speed limit and had swerved around a camper and 
into the opposing traffic lane just before entering the inter-
section. 
In each of the foregoing cases, the court allowed the jury to 
excuse the left-turning driver's failure to yield where the driver 
with the right of way was guilty of some negligent or improper 
conduct. No such circumstance existed in the instant case. 
Petersen was not negligent. The trial court so held based on the 
overwhelming evidence, and Fry has not appealed that determination. 
Reasonable minds could not differ in finding that Fry negligently 
failed to yield the right of way. To find otherwise would be to 
say that a left-turning driver whose view of on-coming traffic is 
obscured may nonetheless forge boldly ahead without regard to what 
perils may await. 
The law forbids such indifference. In French v. Utah Oil 
Refining Co. , 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), for example, the 
plaintiff turned left in an intersection in front of the defen-
dant's truck. The trial court directed a verdict that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent for having failed to yield the 
right of way. This Court affirmed and stated as follows: 
Regardless of his exact position, plaintiff saw 
the truck some 120 feet away from him prior to 
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the time he entered the west lane of traffic 
and never again noticed it until just prior to 
the crash or until it was 6 feet from the point 
of impact. 
216 P.2d at 1003. 
Several other decision have also considered and rejected the 
contention that a driver may ignore hazards obscured by other 
vehicles. E.g., Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59 
(1959); Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2d 983 (1967). 
When faced with a non-negligent victim and a defendant who has 
violated the statute, the courts have not hesitated to direct a 
verdict of negligence. Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 
1975); Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971). 
All the evidence compelled the holding that Petersen was not 
negligent, and that he was doing what he had a right to do and was 
where he had a right to be. See Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc. , 787 
P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Fry had a duty to yield to 
him and was negligent, as a matter of law, for failing to do so. 
There was no substantial competent evidence to the contrary.6 The 
Court of Appeals properly affirmed the directed verdict. 
Fry points to the testimony of his expert witness, Rudolph 
Limpert, who despite extensive testimony of calculations and 
theories could only muster a conclusion that the accident was 
"unfortunate" and that Fry's conduct was not unreasonable if Fry's 
vision of oncoming traffic was blocked. (Fry claimed that a 
station wagon in the left-hand turning lane opposite Fry blocked 
his view.) Mr. Limpert's testimony, however, ignored the un-
disputed fact that Petersen's vehicle was in the right-hand lane 
of travel, did not change lanes prior to the accident, and was in 
a position where Petersen could see Fry. 
The trial court ordered a transcript of Limpert's testimony, 
and granted Rhodes' motion for directed verdict only after 
carefully reviewing the transcript and concluding that Limpert's 
testimony did not support the jury's verdict. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT1 S RULING WAS COMPELLED BY OTHER 
PROPER RULINGS WHICH FRY HAS NOT CHALLENGED. 
Fry requested a jury instruction on "unavoidable accidents." 
The trial court denied the request because the accident did not fit 
in the class of accidents which happen in the absence of negli-
gence. The trial court also held that neither Rhodes nor the 
driver of the vehicle he occupied was negligent. The net effect 
of these rulings, none of which have been challenged by Fry, is 
that the accident was caused by the negligence of some person, and 
the only possible person was Fry. This logic is corroborated by 
the evidence, set forth above in Point II, that Fry was in fact 
negligent. 
Utah decisions have recognized a class of accidents which are 
"unavoidable": 
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e., 
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in 
injury and which happen without any one failing to 
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the 
accident is properly classified as unavoidable 
insofar as legal causation or the imposition of 
liability is concerned. 
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968) 
(footnotes omitted). A later case expressed the same concept: 
If either party can avoid an accident by the 
exercise of proper care, it cannot be said to 
be unavoidable. The issue of unavoidable 
accident arises only where the evidence shows 
that the accident happened from an unknown or 
unforeseen cause or in an unexplainable manner 
which circumstances rebut the defendant's 
alleged negligence. 
Strinaham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974). 
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The converse of this concept is that other accidents (those 
which are not unavoidable) are the result of the negligence of some 
person.7 Application of this concept was illustrated in the 
Florida case of Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., 351 So. 2d 
17 (Fla. 1977) . The plaintiff in that case, as in the instant one, 
"was an innocent passenger, free of any contributory negligence." 
351 So. 2d at 18. The court held that where there was no evidence 
to indicate that the injury was the result of an unavoidable 
accident, and where there was no evidence that the accident was 
caused by anyone not joined in the action, the only possible 
conclusion was that one or more of the defendants was at fault. 
The court held that "the state of the evidence would require a new 
trial if petitioner failed to recover against at least one of the 
defendants. A verdict for all the defendants was legally precluded 
by the evidence." 351 So. 2d at 18-19. 
7This assertion is not contrary to King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 
618 (Utah 1987), cited on page 19 of Fry's brief for the proposi-
tion that a collision alone does not create an inference of 
negligence, nor to McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), 
which is cited in Fry's quotation from King. The plaintiff in King 
was injured when her car was rear-ended by the defendant in heavy 
traffic. The plaintiff in McCloud was injured as he was traveling 
straight through an intersection on his motorcycle and was struck 
by the defendant's car, which came from the opposite direction and 
was turning left. In each case, the plaintiff was found to be 100% 
at fault. The cases stand only for the proposition that an 
inference of negligence may not be based solely upon the position 
or role of the drivers in the accident (i.e., the following car in 
a rear-end collision is not always at fault, nor is the left-
turning car in an intersection collision always at fault). The 
plaintiff in each case was clearly negligent, so the cases did not 
address nore decide the question of whether the mere occurrence of 
a collision creates an inference that some person was negligent, 
in absence of evidence that the collision was "unavoidable." 
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Each of these factors is present in the instant case. The 
accident was not unavoidable. Fry's expert, Rudolph Limpert, 
ultimately characterized the accident as "unfortunate" (R. 497) , 
and did opine that Fry had not done anything unreasonable, but that 
hardly establishes the accident as "unavoidable." The "unfortu-
nate" circumstance identified by Dr. Limpert was that of an alleged 
station wagon in the left hand turn lane opposite from Fry, and 
which Fry claimed blocked his view of the Volkswagen. Even if the 
station wagon was there,8 having one's view blocked by another 
vehicle when wanting to make a left hand turn is certainly not a 
rare or uncommon occurrence. Limpert's blocked view theory ignored 
the undisputed fact that whereas the claimed station wagon was in 
the left-turn lane, Petersen was two lanes over in the right-hand 
lane of travel, and had been in that lane for some distance. 
Petersen's view of Fry was not blocked. The accident could have 
been avoided by Fry waiting until the station wagon completed its 
turn before starting his turn, or by Fry continuing to look for on-
coming vehicles during the course of his turn. The accident was 
not unavoidable as that term has been defined by this Court. 
The instant case, therefore, presents a set of circumstances 
different from the cases relied upon by Fry. The accident was not 
unavoidable. Fry stipulated that plaintiff was not negligent. 
None of the other witnesses recalled any vehicle in the left 
turn lane. Kirk V. Vest, who was traveling behind the Petersen 
vehicle and who was the only independent witness of the accident, 
also testified that he did not recall any other vehicle in the 
intersection. (Tr. 11-19-88 p. 124.) He further testified that the 
Petersen vehicle made no lane changes or sudden movements prior to 
the accident. (Id. at p. 125.) 
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The trial court held, and Fry has not appealed that determination, 
that Petersen was not negligent. There was no claim that the 
accident was caused by any other person. The only possible 
remaining conclusion is that the accident was caused by Fry, and 
this conclusion was supported by the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. The trial court properly directed a verdict against Fry, 
and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. The decision is in accordance with other decisions 
of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. The result reached is 
just. No special or important reason exists to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. The petition for writ of certiorari 
should be denied. 
DATED this /f^ day of November, 1990. 
FRED D. HOWARD and 7/ 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 
Diagram of Accident Scene 

D w a 
EXPLANATION OF ACCIDENT SCENE DIAGRAMS 
The scale on the initial drawings was 1" =10'. The scale on 
these reductions is approximately 1" =33'. 
Exhibit 1 shows the resting place of the vehicles after the 
accident. flFfl indicates Fry's pickup and "P" indicates the 
Petersen Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 50.) 
Exhibit 10 shows the probable path of travel of the vehicles 
leading to the collision. "POI" indicates the point of impact. 
(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 165.) The heavy black line from the cross-walk 
to the point of impact indicates the approximate length of the skid 
marks. (Id. p. 165.) The H.96,f reflects the testimony of Newell 
Knight of the travel time of the Volkswagen while laying down the 
skid marks. (Id.) The remainder of the heavy black line (next to 
"1.5") reflects Mr. Knight's testimony of the distance the 
Volkswagen traveled from the point of perception of the Fry vehicle 
to the application of the brakes (i.e., the reaction time). (Id. 
at 177.) 
The wavy line is an error. (Id. at 177-78.) 
